

EIGHT PAGES

WASHINGTON, D. C., FEBRUARY 1, 1948

## Manchurian Losses Cause Concern Over Jap Future

### MacArthur Sees Gloomy Forecast if Vast Resources Are Used by Russia to Build Economic Dominion in Asia

By Constantine Brown

Gen. MacArthur is more gravely concerned over Gen. Chiang Kai-shek's difficulties in Manchuria than over conditions in Japan itself. He is said to have expressed his concern bluntly by saying that unless Manchuria can be saved from Communist domination the future of Japan will be gloomy indeed. And not only for Japan, but for the United States as well.

At the present time the American taxpayer is subsidizing the Japanese civilian population to the tune of \$1,000,000 a day. The cost of the army of occupation is estimated at about \$2,000,000,000 since V-J day. Under these circumstances it is hardly probable American taxpayers, who will have to dig into their pockets for European relief and possibly for more than \$11,000,000,000 for defense, will be willing to spend considerable amounts for Japan in the near future.

Yet, as Gen. MacArthur has pointed out, eventual inclosure of Manchuria and Korea behind the iron curtain will make it difficult for Japan to count on substantial recovery after the peace treaty is signed. In the past the Japanese have imported from Manchuria large quantities of wheat, soy beans, coal and other minerals, including gold. The imports amounted to about \$50,000,000 a year.

While there are reasonable prospects of economic and political undertaking between China and Japan after the peace is concluded, the considered opinion of all observers in the Far East is that Russia will use the natural resources of Manchuria and Korea to force Japan itself behind the iron curtain in Asia.

### Marshall Gets Blame

Today, according to reports from our military observers in China, Manchuria is practically lost to China. There are 650,000 well-equipped Communist soldiers in that province against some 175,000 soldiers of the regular Chinese Army.

Congressional quarters, which have been far more interested in China's plight recently than the administration, place the blame for this situation squarely on the doorstep of the State Department in general and on Secretary of State Marshall in particular.

Although there are some indications in conversations between members of Congress and President Truman, that the White House has no fundamental opposition to support of the Chiang regime, which, despite its many shortcomings, has been loyal to its wartime Allies, there are definite indications that the State Department is placing every kind of obstacle in the way of support for the Kuomintang.

Gen. Marshall has never liked Gen. Chiang. This antagonism dates back to the days when Gen. Joseph Stilwell, a close and trusted friend of the wartime chief of staff, was the American representative at Chungking. It is well known that Gen. Stilwell and the generalissimo were allergic to each other.

Besides this personal antagonism, Gen. Stilwell became convinced that the Chinese Communists were nothing but agrarians who wanted to reform China and save it from the corrupt practices of the venal Kuomintang. Gen. Stilwell was able to convince his chief in Washington as to the correctness of his views, which were shared by many "experts" in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. One of these was the former division chief, John Carter Vincent, now Minister to Switzerland.

**Chiang Angry Over Request**  
At the instigation of Gen. Stilwell, Gen. Marshall is said to have cabled a suggestion during the war that the Chinese forces be placed under direct American command. Gen. Chiang became angry when this suggestion was reported to him and told our Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, that compliance with this request would mean in effect that he was surrendering his command to the United States and would become a mere puppet.

President Roosevelt, who was apprised of this situation by his Ambassador, had some harsh words to say and Gen. Stilwell was replaced as Gen. Chiang's chief of staff by the smoother and more effective Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Soon after Gen. Marshall retired as Army Chief of Staff he was urged by President Truman to accept the task of special presidential envoy to China. Gen. Marshall accepted the job reluctantly. Throughout the war, he carefully avoided becoming entangled in politics, domestic or international, and felt strongly that he did not have the necessary preparation for any responsible diplomatic position. But when President Truman offered to send him to China "to settle the mess out there" left by the spectacular resignation of Mr. Hurley, Gen. Marshall treated it as an order from his Commander in Chief.

### Believed Truce Possible

Gen. Marshall's mind had already been conditioned, however. He believed strongly that only Gen. Chiang's stubbornness and the intrigues of his corrupt advisers inside and outside the cabinet prevented an understanding with the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

The general was also convinced that Chinese Communists were nothing but agrarian reformers and, unlike those in Europe, were not actual puppets of Moscow. Gen. Marshall is said to have heard Prime Minister Stalin himself poking fun at the Chinese Communists when they were discussed at the Yalta Conference which gave Russia an entering wedge in Manchuria.

The Marshall Plan for China's pacification was simple. A truce should be called between the warring factions and a new government, including some prominent leaders from the Communist side, should be organized at once.

### Failure Stopped Loan

Gen. Marshall's efforts to put his plans into effect failed. In his "farewell address" when he left China he did not blame Gen. Chiang exclusively for the failure, which was the first blow to his prestige as Army Chief of Staff. He is said, however, to have felt strongly that the Chinese leader had not been sufficiently co-operative.

As a result the \$500,000,000 earmarked as a loan for China was never made available and the State Department withheld for one year all export licenses for arms and ammunition for the Chinese government forces. The policy of the State Department was, "No Communists in the government, no money."

The Russians, who signed a treaty of friendship with China on August 15, 1945, used their usual tricks. Officially relations between Moscow and Nanking are friendly. But from the first day that it entered Manchuria, the Russian Army started to support the Chinese Communist forces.

The Russians informed the Communists of the date when the Red Army was to withdraw from certain important sections of that richest province of China and allowed Communist units to take their place.

Although the port of Dairen was to be shared equally by the Chinese and Russians, the former never were permitted to utilize it for the troops they were sending to Manchuria. Moreover, the Russians supplied the Chinese Communists with ample war material, winter clothing—which is as essential in that area as food and ammunition—and instructors to show the Communists how to handle modern weapons.

Thus, while the U. S. S. R. was supporting its Yenan stooges in every conceivable way, the United States did not allow the established government of China any kind of assistance, under the pretext that the Kuomintang was corrupt and that assistance would be squandered to make the rich few richer.

### Wedemeyer Report Secret

Last summer, President Truman ordered Gen. Wedemeyer to return to China to investigate on the spot what could be done to remedy the difficult situation. Gen. Wedemeyer spent several weeks in China, which he knew well, and made a substantial report of his findings and recommendations. That report is still classified top secret by the State Department and has not been given out, even to members of Congress who must appropriate funds for foreign relief. The old wartime excuse that publication would be against the public interest is used.

Last December China was included in the stopgap relief program on the initiative of Congress. Eighteen million dollars was appropriated and it was understood by members of the Appropriations Committee that shortly after the start of the present session, a program for greater assistance to China would be presented to Congress. This demand by Congress that China be included in the over-all Marshall Plan was the result of positive statements made under oath at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee by Gen. Wedemeyer, who was subpoenaed as a witness.

To a question from Chairman Bridges as to whether Gen. Wedemeyer considered it urgent that China receive military and economic assistance, Gen. Wedemeyer replied emphatically, "Yes, sir, I do." To a further question by Senator Bridges as to whether he believed we have kept our promises to China over the years, the answer was equally positive, "No, sir, I do not."

### Plan Still Lacking

In spite of formal promises to Congress that a plan for aid to China would be forthcoming, nothing has been done for the present. The State Department still shuffles its feet over that problem.


A gigantic plan to help 16 nations in Europe with some \$20,000,000,000 over a period of four years was discussed with the European nations and put into final form within six months after the idea was formulated by Gen. Marshall.

In spite of the immensity of the problem, involving discussions with many foreign governments and analysis of their resources, the plan was ready for Congress within a relatively short time. Yet the State Department, which had to study the needs of one country in the Far East, has not yet been able to draft a plan which would need less than 10 per cent of the amount required for one year in Europe.

Meanwhile, the disintegration of China's forces leading to the loss of Manchuria, which is regarded as one of the vital, strategic points in America's defense, continues unabated. The time is approaching when the State Department "experts" truthfully may say, "It is too late now."

## Valhalla for Venerable Battleships

### New Mexico, Idaho and Wyoming Die in Bustle of Big Business, but Their Steel Will Help Dwindling Scrap Piles



Three United States battleships, the New Mexico (foreground), the Idaho (behind her) and the Wyoming (at left), are being scrapped at Newark, N. J. Steel from the over-age, outmoded 38,000-ton battlewagons will help feed the Nation's blast furnaces. The New Mexico and Idaho saw much action in the last war, while the Wyoming was used as a training ship.—Wide World Photo.

By Hiliard A. Schendorf

NEWARK, N. J.—Three sister battleships are on their way to the Valhalla of good fighting ships, and their steel is going to bolster this country's scant scrap reserves.

Overaged, outmoded and obsolete, the New Mexico, Idaho and Wyoming, all 38,000-ton battlewagons, are being cut into great steel snips by the New York salvage firm of Lipsett, Inc., to help feed the blast furnaces of the Nation.

The New Mexico and Idaho were commissioned in 1918 and 1919, respectively, too late to see action in World War I. In the last war both played important parts, fighting the Japanese all the way from the Aleutians to Okinawa.

### Look Part in Scapa Flow

During World War II, the Wyoming fired more antiaircraft ammunition than any other ship, but not at the enemy. She was used as a training ship. Commissioned in 1912, the Wyoming was attached to the British grand fleet and took part in the internment of the German Navy at Scapa Flow in World War I.

Lipsett estimates the three old ships will yield 61,000 tons of vital steel scrap.

The superstructure and deck of the venerable New Mexico, which fought the "cold battle" of Newark Bay to reach her last resting place, is cut away now and crews of workmen are reducing her to the water line.

The city of Newark, opposed to making its port a "boneyard of ships," blocked the channel to the port with two minuscule fireboats.

to keep out the decommissioned dreadnaught. The fireboat blockade was withdrawn only after the Navy promised not to make any additional plans for scrapping at Port Newark after completion of the current program.

Stripped from the gray ships in this nautical graveyard is the pomp and tradition in which they lived. They are dying in an atmosphere of bustle and big business.

In Lipsett's tiny office, under three calendars and a clock, telephone jangle as salesmen sweat to provide tools and accountants and engineers chart the scrapping. The job must be done by September 1.

Lipsett needed five bazookas—great cutting torches which bite through solid steel.

"Will a week do?" asked a salesman. "They're in Pittsburgh." "Get 'em on a plane tonight," snapped Office Manager Jim London.

Old Hands Revisit Ship

Occasionally a Navy man who has served on one of the battleships drops in, usually to try to pick up a souvenir.

Don Smith of Bayonne, a burner for Lipsett, was on the Idaho as a shipfitter, second class, during the war. Is he sorry to be cutting her up?

"No," says Mr. Smith—"Smitty" to the gang. "She's lived her life,

and now it's a good thing she can help out the country with the steel in her."

Lipsett scrapped the former French luxury liner Normandie after it had burned at a New York pier while being converted into an American troopship. Cutting up the battleships is "apple pie" compared to that job, says Mr. London.

### Normandie Was Problem

"The Normandie was 1,100 feet long, and the battleships are only half that," he adds.

In addition, the Normandie had to be watched carefully—checked daily with super-sensitive strain gauges—to avert the danger that as steel was cut away and weight shifted, the ship might buckle and sink.

The battleships, built to navigate with gaping chunks shot away, can be cut down without such concern. Like the Normandie, the battleships are being lightened in the bow by weighting the stern. As the bow rises, sections ahead of water-tight bulkheads will be cut off. Finally, there will remain only one compartment.

### 25,000-Ton Yield

If that still is too heavy for a powerful traveling crane to lift, Lipsett will use a technique it developed in scrapping the French ship. It will build a new bulkhead across the last compartment, cut off one-half, then lift out the other piece.

The last section of the Normandie weighed only 60 tons—all in a day's work for the cranes.

Mr. London estimates that the New Mexico will yield the greatest

amount of scrap steel—25,000 tons.

The Idaho has a smaller double hull below the water line, and its guns were removed by the Navy before delivery. It should provide 21,000 tons.

The Wyoming was being converted to a cruiser when the Navy decided to sell it for scrap and the outer hull and guns were already off. It is tagged by Lipsett for 15,000 tons.

The Normandie yielded 43,000 tons of scrap.

The scrapping is going ahead so fast that the superstructures of the ships disappear in a matter of weeks. The ships are carved down to the water line in two months, and at the end of four months, they will have disappeared altogether.

Other Salvage Made

The Normandie took eight months to scrap.

In addition to steel, the three battleships are yielding boilers, motors and generators. All of the machinery in the Normandie was either fire-damaged or of odd foreign sizes, so it was cut up, too.

Coming out of the dwindling hulls, together with steel and machinery, is an odd assortment of chairs labeled "CPO" from the chief petty officers' lounge, electric fans which operate only on direct current and are not being salvaged, lockers and beds just as seamen left them.

Other furnishings and equipment were removed by the Navy before it delivered the old ships for the coup de grace.

(Distributed by the Associated Press.)

## Cuban Revolt Menaced '33 Parley, Hull Recalls

### Former Secretary of State Tells How Armed Intervention Boiled Down to Sending a Cruiser

By Cordell Hull

Intensifying the bitterness in the Western Hemisphere as I crossed the threshold of the State Department was the fact that the Latin American republics were falling out among themselves. The Chaco War, one of the most violent ever fought in the New World, was raging in the jungles between Paraguay and Bolivia. A border conflict had broken out between Colombia and Peru and threatened to develop into real war.

In Cuba the government of dictatorial Gen. Gerardo Machado was slipping its cinch after 12 years in the saddle, and revolution was plotting.

The situation hurried to a climax, with widespread rioting and growing mutiny in the Cuban Army. The Céspedes government collapsed following a revolt within the army led by the rank and file under Sergt. Fulgencio Batista. At that moment, September 7, I received a long telegram from Ambassador Welles suggesting that a considerable American armed force be landed at Havana and smaller forces in other Cuban cities.

"What I propose," he telegraphed, "would be a strictly limited intervention of the following nature. The Céspedes government should be permitted to function freely in exactly the same manner as it did until the time of its overthrow, having full control of every branch of the government. It is obvious, of course, that with a great portion of the army in mutiny, it could not maintain itself in power in any satisfactory manner unless the United States Government were willing, should it (the Céspedes government) so request, to lend its assistance in the maintenance of public order until the Cuban government had been afforded the time sufficient . . . to form a new army . . . . Such a policy on our part would presumably entail the landing of a considerable force at Havana and lesser forces in certain of the more important ports of the republic."

Ambassador Welles said further, "The disadvantages of this policy as I see them lie solely in the fact that we will incur the violent animosity of the extreme radical and Communist groups in Cuba . . . it would further seem to me that since the full facts of the situation here have been fully explained to the representatives of the Latin American countries, the landing of such assistance would most decidedly be construed as well within the limits of the policy of the 'good neighbor' which we have done our utmost to demonstrate in our relations with the Cuban people during the past five months."

### Confers With Roosevelt

The moment I finished digesting the telegram I took it myself to the President at the White House and had him read it. I then strongly expressed to him my opinion that we could not and should not think of intervening in Cuba even to a limited extent. It seemed to me that Mr. Welles was overinfluenced by local conditions in Cuba and misjudged the disastrous reaction that would follow throughout Latin America if we agreed to his suggestion. From my previous conversations with the President, I knew that he was as resolved as myself to stay out of Cuba. Mr. Roosevelt readily agreed with my viewpoint. He said he would merely send a cruiser to Cuban waters, where we already had some light units. The naval vessels were strictly forbidden to send forces ashore unless it were necessary to evacuate American citizens caught between the contending Cuban factions.

### Welles Goes to Cuba

Mr. Welles left for Cuba in May, 1933, bearing with him instructions from me, dated May 1, which said: "You will always bear in mind that the relations between the Government of the United States and the Cuban government are those existing between sovereign, independent and equal powers; and that no steps should be taken which would tend to render more likely the need of the Government of the United States to resort to that right of formal intervention granted to the United States by the existing treaty between the two nations." I instructed him to extend what assistance we could to better Cuba's economic conditions, to negotiate a trade agreement with Cuba, to offer his friendly mediation, and to express to President Machado our earnest hope that he would take steps to end the state of terrorism.

On August 12 Gen. Machado took leave of absence and on the day thereafter Dr. Carlos de Céspedes, former Secretary of State, formed a coalition government. Widespread disorders and attacks on persons and property followed Machado's exit. President Roosevelt ordered two destroyers to Cuban waters, but said this involved no possible question of intervention or of the slightest interference with the internal affairs of Cuba.

We decided it was not necessary to grant President de Céspedes formal recognition, since the change of government had been achieved by constitutional process. Ambassador Welles was working hard, keeping in touch with all factions, and on August 12 the department cabled him warm congratulations and "appreciation of what you have done" from the President and myself.

### Welles Suggests Force

I held frequent conversations on Cuba with the Ambassadors of important Latin American countries. This was in line with the decision I had reached that whatever diplomatic actions were called for on our part in Latin America would be taken only after consultation with

the interested countries to the South of us. We would no longer make single-handed moves.

The situation hurried to a climax, with widespread rioting and growing mutiny in the Cuban Army. The Céspedes government collapsed following a revolt within the army led by the rank and file under Sergt. Fulgencio Batista. At that moment, September 7, I received a long telegram from Ambassador Welles suggesting that a considerable American armed force be landed at Havana and smaller forces in other Cuban cities.

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After my conference with the President I went to my hotel—it was already late in the day—to compose the reply to Mr. Welles. When it was completed, I returned to the White House, where the President and I quickly agreed on the draft. I then went to the State Department and at 8 o'clock in the evening sent the answer we had agreed upon as follows:

"We fully appreciate the various viewpoints set forth in your telegram. However, after mature consideration, the President has decided to send you the following message: 'We feel very strongly that any promise, implied or otherwise, relating to what the United States will do under any circumstances is impossible that it would be regarded as a breach of neutrality, as favoring one faction out of many, as attempting to set up a government which would be regarded by the whole world, and especially throughout Latin America, as a creation and creature of the American Government.' The President's conversations with the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican representatives have received widespread approval in the United States and throughout Latin America and any action contrary to the policy outlined therein would have disastrous results."

Neutrality Stressed

"The above does not mean, of course, that you should do anything to block or in the least affect any movement by any section; in other words, strict neutrality is of the essence."

The de Céspedes government having fallen, Dr. Grau San Martín became President. We delayed recognition of his government to see whether it could establish order. Fighting among the factions continued. Such was the situation when I sailed for the Montevideo Conference. Two weeks after my departure the President issued a statement expressing the willingness of our Government to reopen the treaty of 1903 which gave us the legal right to intervene militarily in Cuba. Our record on nonintervention was therefore to be clear to

(See HULL, Page C-5.)

## 150,000 Army Officers May Lose Rank July 1

By John A. Giles

Approximately 150,000 Army officers are likely to complete the duration-and-six-months clause of their commissions on July 1.

On that date, as a result of the expiration of certain presidential war powers January 1, their Army of the United States commissions will become null and void and they will find themselves absolute civilians with no military ties.

The Army and the Air Force made a determined effort to get these A. U. S. officers to apply for Reserve commissions at the time of separation from active duty and those with World War II experience still may join the Organized Reserve Corps until June 30. After that date, in the words of a Reserve section spokesman, "they'll have to see the chaplain"—meaning that the services have no further plan at present for commissioning wartime A. U. S. officers.

While the Army is a bit uncertain as to the total number of A. U. S. officers who would be affected by the June 30 deadline, because many of them also hold Reserve commissions as well, and therefore show up in both categories, many have died, etc., the aggregate is likely to run around 150,000 at least.

### Many Have Dual Commissions

A survey showed that there is no comparable situation in the Navy and United States Naval Reserve officers are exactly in the same status they were when they were separated no matter whether they have joined organized Reserve units or not. Their commissions continue in force "during the pleasure of the President."

The bulk of the 518,084 officers and 631,255 enlisted men on the Army and Air Force Reserve rolls joined the Reserve as a result of service in World War II. Most of the officers were A. U. S. officers who received their wartime commissions through schools or on the battlefield. When they passed through separation centers they were given an opportunity to take Reserve commissions in grades based on their A. U. S. rank at the time, their length of service in grade and their efficiency ratings as officers.

At the beginning of 1947 the privilege of enrolling in the Reserve was extended to A. U. S. officers still on active duty under the same provisions as those prevailing at separation centers. As a result of this latter provision, many officers now serving in the Army have dual commissions, one being in the A. U. S., due to expire June 30, and one in the Reserve. In many cases the Reserve commission is in a higher grade than the A. U. S. one, and in those instances it is the latter in which the officer is serving on active duty.

There are also some 37,000 A. U. S. officers and O. R. C. officers with appointments dated prior to June 28, 1945, on active duty and they will be notified prior to March 1 to apply for new Reserve commissions if they desire to continue.

There are exceptions to the general statement that the Army has no further plans after June 30 for giving Reserve commissions to wartime A. U. S. officers. Specialists—doctors, dentists, clergymen, investigators—likely will continue to be taken into the Reserve, but the line officers with no specialized experience will find the door closed. A. U. S. officers who change their minds between now and that time may apply to the senior Reserve Officer Training Corps instructor in their State, whose address may be obtained from any recruiting station, or by writing to the Department of the Army here.

### Few Units Reach Class A

The Army Reserve program embraces training of both units and individuals, with the accent mainly on unit training of a progressive nature designed to bring a Reserve organization gradually up to wartime strength and efficiency. When a reserve unit is first activated, it is placed in "Class C" among Reserve outfits and has only officers assigned to it. According to schedule, it will advance later to "Class B" when key enlisted men are assigned and certain items of equipment are allocated. The unit reaches its final "Class A" stage when it is completely manned and equipped.

At present, with the Army-Air Force Reserve program about a year and a half old, the great majority of the units are in the lower

two classes. Some will be advanced shortly to Class A; for others, the program calls for more or less permanent assignment in the two other classes.

The Army is currently making an effort to assign all Reserve officers to such training units. In the Washington area alone, all Army Reserve officers, except those who hold Air Force commissions, recently were ordered to join Reserve units voluntarily or be assigned to them arbitrarily. The number given such orders approximated 4,000.

Heretofore, joining the Army Reserve units has been on a voluntary basis, a situation which still prevails in the Navy.

### Navy Officers Subject to Orders

In the Navy, Reserve officers whose active duty days are over are now carried on an inactive duty status, subject to orders, just as when they were originally commissioned. The Navy still has 7,800 officers and 13,200 enlisted men of its Reserve on active duty.

Naval Reservists can participate in an organized Reserve program or merely belong to the Volunteer Reserve. The former is composed primarily of seagoing officers and men who, in time of mobilization, would be called up immediately to augment the fleet. It includes surface, submarine and air groups. More than half of the money appropriated for the Naval Reserve this fiscal year has been spent on aviation training. The Organized Reservists received one night's drill pay weekly for 50 weeks annually, in addition to two weeks' active duty annually.

To train the Organized Reserve, the Navy has announced plans for building 314 training centers in 300 cities, one of which is being completed almost every day. It also has assigned 189 ships—destroyers, submarines, destroyer escorts, minesweepers, PCs and smaller craft—to the organized units.

The Volunteer Naval Reserve includes all officers and men not in the Organized Reserve and the Navy considers that although they are essential to its mobilization needs they do not require so high a degree of initial readiness and training. They are entitled to request two weeks' annual training duty for which they are paid. The vast majority of the Navy's wartime reservists are in this category.

The Navy is currently some 35 per cent over its "planning requirements" for Reserve officers, with 284,206 on board, compared with a planned total of 210,000. The organized units, however, are about 73 per cent of planning requirements, with a total of 17,811 officers on board, as against a projected complement of 24,403.

### The Army Freed Millions

Both the Army and Navy were guilty of violation of the Selective Service Act in setting enlisted men free of military ties to comply with insistent public demand that the veterans return to their homes after World War II.

The provision, written into the original Selective Service Act of September, 1940, and never revoked, declared:

"Each man, after the completion of his training and service . . . shall be transferred to a Reserve component of the land or naval forces of the United States . . . until he attains the age of 45 or until the expiration of a period of 10 years after such transfer."

It added that two years' additional service in the Regular Army or the National Guard would exempt men from the Reserve service.

The Army, of course, is more guilty of violating the section, since so many of its millions of men were brought into service under the act.

However, when naval enlisted reservists were separated from active duty they were outright discharged in the rush to meet feverish public demands that they be released without delay. Hence, it has been necessary for the sea arm to go out and interest the enlisted Reserves as well as young nonveterans in its current programs. Last month U. S. N. R. V-6 re-enlistments and enlistments for inactive duty totaled 15,969, bringing the aggregate thus recruited to 654,281.

At present the enlisted Naval Reserve is around 65 per cent of planning requirements, of whom 70 per cent are in the Organized Reserves.